ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS
Paul C. Szasz*
I have been asked to address today the dual question of what is
the United Nations definition of an "internal" conflict and what, if
any, role the United Nations may have to play in such conflicts.
To put this problem in context, it may be useful to present some
illustrative examples: Was India justified in characterizing the
question of Hyderabad as a purely internal one after it had completed its occupation of that princely state in September 1948, so
as to preclude further Security Council consideration of the Nizam's complaint? Could the United Kingdom claim that its bombing of Stanley airport was an internal matter, as the Falkland Islands are a British possession?
Actually, the term "internal" is not one used in the Charter.
Rather, that instrument refers to the "domestic jurisdiction" of a
state. The provision in which this expression appears is article 2,
paragraph 7, which reads in full as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
What, then, has been the practice of the United Nations in interpreting the clause "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state"? The brief time available here will not permit a review of all aspects of this question. Instead, I will examine only
one: can or must a conflict within a state, that is one that does not
pit two nations against each other, be a matter entirely within that
state's domestic jurisdiction, as these terms are used in the Charter? This issue has actually arisen fairly frequently in the sense
that over the years a number of conflicts were brought to the at*Principal Officer, Office of the United Nations Legal Counsel. The views expressed
herein do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations.
I U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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tention of one or more organs of the United Nations (usually the
General Assembly and/or the Security Council), over the objection
of the state primarily concerned that the matter fell entirely within
its domestic jurisdiction and could therefore not be examined by
any United Nations organ. In some cases these objections were accepted; in many others they were not. An analysis of these two
lines of decisions might therefore lead to an inductive definition of
"domestic jurisdiction."
In some instances in which a conflict was brought to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council with the request that these organs take some steps with regard to it, and the
state primarily concerned argued that the matter was a domestic
one, the counter-argument was that the mere fact that the conflict
had engaged the attention of the international community to the
extent that action by a United Nations organ was under consideration indicated that the conflict could not be considered to be essentially domestic, i.e., purely internal. Of course, such an extensive interpretation-a Donne-ian statement that no country is a
figurative island-would make nonsense of the restriction in article
2(7) of the Charter. Certainly, such an extreme reductionist argument does not aid legal analysis any more than a diagnosis of
mental illness can be based on the mere fact of a visit to a
psychiatrist.
A more respectable variant of this argument, which cannot, however, be applied to all conflicts, is that certain of them may constitute a threat to international peace and security. In effect, it is said
that even if the conflict by its nature is essentially domestic, the
very fact that it is taking place in some way threatens the security
of others and the good order of the international community. This,
for example, has been claimed with respect to the racial conflict in
South Africa: not only does apartheid constitute a major violation2
of human rights, but systematic behavior or a particular event
that makes the blood of other men boil constitutes or may result in
a threat to the peace, and thus convert an ostensibly domestic conflict into an international one. From a narrow analytical point of
' The Sharpeville massacre would represent such an event. On March 21, 1960, South
African police opened fire on a large crowd of natives moving toward the police station at
Sharpeville. An inquiry showed that many of the dead and wounded were struck from the
rear. The judicial report found that the shooting had not been justified by the attitude of
the crowd. For an account of the massacre and related events, see J. HOAGLOND, SOUTH
AFmCA-CIvIIZATIONS IN CONFLICT
NAMICS OF APARTHEID (1968).

(1972); see also W.
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view it may either be said that a threat to international peace by
definition cannot be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state or that the reference to Chapter VII enforcement
at the end of article 2(7) of the Charter creates a specific exception
for situations that constitute such threats, whether or not they are
essentially domestic. However, the practical effect of these alternative interpretations is not identical, for the former would presumably apply to any threat to the peace, and the latter only to those
for which the Security Council has decided on enforcement action-a much more restricted category.
Obviously, one aspect of a purportedly domestic conflict that
must be taken into account in deciding whether it conceivably constitutes a threat to international peace is its size and intensity.
Thus, a small riot in a limited area and for a short period of time
could hardly justify international concern or intervention. However, major and continuous civil disorders-for example such as occurred in Poland during recent times-by their very volume and
duration may be of international concern. On the other hand, we
also know that during the past decades there have been violent
domestic upheavals resulting in thousands and perhaps millions of
deaths-such as the post-partition riots on the Asian subcontinent,
the Cultural Revolution in the Peoples Republic of China, and the
anti-communist purges in Indonesia-which never provoked any
serious proposals for United Nations intervention. In other words,
while size and intensity are obviously relevant as to whether a conflict is still "domesticated," they must be considered in combination with other factors to determine whether a particular conflict is
international.
One significant factor is that of outside intervention. Thus, the
upheavals just referred to, those in India, Pakistan, China and Indonesia, were on the one hand almost entirely domestically generated and resulted in no significant foreign involvement; in contrast,
extensive accusations of foreign intervention have been made with
respect to the recent events in Poland. In deciding, however,
whether such intervention necessarily internationalizes a conflict, a
difficult legal-political question is put at issue: If the outside involvement is entirely invited by the government of the state concerned, does such involvement internationalize the conflict? The
inviting government and those that assist it will normally argue
that it is an entirely internal matter for each state to decide
whether to request or to grant transnational assistance, be it of an
economic, political, technical, or military nature, and as long as no
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third states are unwillingly involved, the conflict for which the assistance is granted is not thereby internationalized. On the other
hand, the same governments are likely to argue that if the external
assistance is not requested by or granted to the government of the
state in whose territory the conflict is taking place, but is received
by an unauthorized or illegal political entity (e.g., a group of insurgents), then the conflict may thereby be rendered international.
The difference, of course, is that assistance to an insurgent group
by a foreign government places that government in conflict with
the government of the state concerned, thereby creating an intergovernmental, and thus, an interstate conflict. By this reasoning,
which is still implicitly widely accepted, although not necessarily
explicitly endorsed, the crucial factor in characterizing an externally assisted conflict as domestic or international is whether the
assistance is rendered to "legitimate" or "illegitimate" authorities.
A conflict may, of course, be internationalized if it or its consequences actually overflow the borders of the state primarily concerned. The most common spillover from an otherwise essentially
domestic conflict is a flow of refugees. In recent years there unfortunately have been several examples of such flows that have been
so massive as to internationalize a conflict. For example, during the
1971 East Pakistan war of independence, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, so many Bengalis took refuge in India that
the intervention of that country became almost inevitable. More
recently, the massive flows of refugees from Kampuchea into Thailand and from Afghanistan into Pakistan have been among the
principal reasons why the United Nations has considered the conflicts within Kampuchea and Afghanistan not to be purely
domestic.3
With or without such a flow of refugees, an otherwise domestic.
conflict may spill over borders in the form of military actions. This
was constantly one of the important aspects of the so-called Second Indochina War, in which the United States was involved, and
is now a factor in the conflicts within several Central American
countries. Related to such military spillover, there may be flows of
external assistance to one or more of the parties to the domestic
conflict. Indeed, the purpose of military actions outside the primary state may be to interdict such assistance, or perhaps to in3 The other reason, of course, was that in each of the conflicts there was also an intervention by a powerful neighbor invited by a government whose independence, and thus legitimacy, could be questioned.
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hibit the flow or activities of refugees.
Having pointed to certain characteristics of a conflict that may
result in internationalizing it, I would now like to call attention to
the fact that the subject matter of a conflict may have the same
effect.
Over the decades since the end of the Second World War, a significant political, but by now really a legal, change has occurred in
the characterization of colonial conflicts, i.e. those involving a territory whose people are essentially non-self-governing. In the early
days of the United Nations these conflicts were considered to be
essentially domestic; whatever a colonial power did in a territory
under its control was treated as its own business. Naturally, the
mandate system established under the League of Nations had already constituted a deviation from this principle, for mandated
territories were not considered to be domestic, and conflicts within
them were of international concern by definition.4 The same reasoning naturally applied to the United Nations trusteeships that
succeeded the League mandates.5 However, in other dependent
territories, change occurred more slowly. Thus, several metropolitan powers, in particular France and Portugal, took the attitude
that certain of their overseas territories constituted integral parts
of the mother country and consequently revolts (now called wars of
national liberation) in these overseas dominions were merely of domestic concern. On this ground, United Nations consideration of
the conflicts in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique were successfully resisted for some years. Nevertheless,
as these conflicts persisted, their characterization as purely domestic became less and less tenable, and less and less accepted. Gradually each of these conflicts was exposed to increasingly intensive
scrutiny by the United Nations-a scrutiny that surely accelerated
the attainment of independence by these territories. With the
adoption by the General Assembly in 1960 of its crucial decolonization resolution, 6 the possibility of any United Nations organ char-

Every mandate charter contains the following provision:
The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the
Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it
cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League.
Terms of League of Nations Mandates (UN Document A/70, Oct. 1946).
6 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91.
6 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (this
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acterizing a colonial conflict as domestic disappeared. By now it
can probably be asserted as a matter of international law that a
"colonial" situation or conflict is not an essentially domestic one,
though of course to some extent this merely shifts the argument to
whether a particular situation is colonial.
Another aspect of a conflict that may result in internationalization is the occurrence of significant human rights violations. This is
particularly so when the violations are the essence of the conflict,
as in the apartheid regime in South Africa. The United Nations
concluded long ago that the very maintenance of a forced system
of racial separation and oppression is contrary to the Charter, and
therefore is of international concern by its very nature-as are any
conflicts arising out of attempts to maintain or overthrow such a
system. 8
In many conflicts, however, the human rights violations are not
of the essence; rather, they are by-products of violent struggles in
which atrocities are committed by all parties, but often most prominently by the government. In light of the increasing sensitivity of
the international community toward human rights violations of all
kinds, these instances may also attract the attention of United Nations organs, including the General Assembly, toward an otherwise
purely internal conflict (such as that some years ago in Chile), and
these instances may be used to justify a measure of intervention by
the organization.
It goes almost without saying that an otherwise internal conflict
may be internationalized if some of its aspects are subject to an
international agreement or involve some foreign interests. Thus,
the initial concern of the General Assembly for conditions in South
Africa was focused on the treatment by that country of persons of
Indian descent, before apartheid had become the official governmental policy and before human rights issues were recognized by
the world organization as almost automatically having transnational implications. The natural interest of the Indian Government, whether based on certain treaties or on ties of nationality or

resolution proclaimed the necessity of ending colonialism in all of its forms). See also G.A.
Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) (this resolution set
up a special committee to oversee the application of Resolution 1514).
7 To see that this question is not an easy one, it is only necessary to contemplate the
situation of Puerto Rico, which the United States and the great majority of Puerto Ricans
consider to be a self-governing commonwealth, but which many countries and a few Puerto
Ricans consider to be an oppressed colony.
8 See G.A. Res. 721, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
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race, was considered sufficient by a majority of the General Assembly to de-domesticate the issue. Similarly, the treatment by Italy
of the German-speaking population in the Alto-Adige (Sud Tyrol)
was for some years the subject of General Assembly consideration,
which was justified in part by the agreement relating to this subject that Austrian and Italian officials had concluded in Paris some
years earlier.
Members of this distinguished audience may have noted, perhaps with some unease, that the foregoing analysis was somewhat
longer on description than on precision, thus suggesting that the
Charter's article 2(7) ban on United Nations intervention in domestic matters, when applied to internal conflicts, depends on
vague concepts such as perceived threats to peace and security, the
magnitude and persistence of a conflict, and the extent to which it
has significant human rights aspects. Indeed, it must be admitted
that the factors I presented have largely been subjective rather
than objective, political rather than legal, vague rather than
precise.
The reason for this approach does not lie entirely in the notorious, but sometimes exaggerated, indefiniteness of public international law, but mostly in the fact that the interpretation of this
Charter provision has been left almost entirely to the most highly
political organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly and
the Security Council. The International Court of Justice has never
yet been faced squarely with an article 2(7) issue-which, presumably, could hardly arise out of its jurisdiction over contentious
cases to which the United Nations itself cannot be a party, but
might arise out of the exercise of its advisory function-though it
has had occasion to give it peripheral consideration in half-a-dozen
cases. 9 The Secretary-General himself is also constrained by the
Charter provision, and thus, must consider its interpretation; but
in practice most such issues arise in the context of his article 98
task of performing functions entrusted to him by the representative organs, which leaves it for those organs to decide on the limits
of the organization's competence.
9 See, e.g., Aegean Sea, Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 71 (Judgement
of Dec. 19); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 145 (Advisory opinion of Oct. 16); Nuclear Tests
(Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 311, 377, 383 (Judgement of Dec. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(W. Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 226 (Judgement of July 25); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.),
1973 I.C.J. 99, 130 (Judgement of June 23); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. 151, 196, 297, 298, 302 (Advisory opinion of July 20); Conditions of Admission of a
State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57 (Advisory opinion of May 28).
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In attempting to interpret and analyze the decisions of the
United Nations political organs on these questions, care must be
taken not to misinterpret a lack of action by the organization regarding a particular conflict as implying a conclusion that such action was barred by article 2(7) of the Charter. Unlike Sherlock
Holmes, who could base a valid conclusion on the silence of a
hound, international lawyers would be remiss if they tried to apply
the same reasoning to this article. If the organization fails to act in
respect of some matter, such as the Viet-Nam War, it is unlikely
that such abstention is based on a unanimous conclusion that it is
essentially domestic. More realistically, it may have been generally
concluded that there was no useful way in which it could intervene
at all, under the circumstances and given the nature of the parties-that is, considering the practical rather than the legal constraints on the United Nations.
Contrariwise, whenever the United Nations does intervene in an
apparently internal conflict, and does so over the objection of the
state primarily concerned, it is possible to deduce that the competent representative organ must have concluded that there is some
reason why article 2(7) of the Charter was not applicable-that is,
that there are some features that justify attributing some international aspects to that conflict.
Having thus outlined at least the principal considerations relevant to deciding when the United Nations considers a conflict to
be "internal," I would now like to touch, albeit only most briefly,
on what role, if any, the world organization can play with respect
to such conflicts.
First of all, it is clear that if it is concluded that a particular
conflict is internal (that is, "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"), then the United Nations may not "intervene" therein. Although the final clause of article 2(7) of the Charter would appear to create an exception for those situations where
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter are undertaken, these situations cannot be characterized as purely domestic since, under article 39, the Security Council may only resort
to Chapter VII enforcement measures after it has determined "the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression." Consequently, the apparent exception is not one at all,
but merely a derivation from the basic definition of what is essentially a domestic matter.
This conclusion, however, immediately raises the question of
what is an "intervention" prohibited by the Charter. This, too, has
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been much debated in the political organs of the United Nations.
Time does not allow the presentation of even a summary of these
debates, but I will list some of the actual or proposed actions with
respect to which this question has been raised.
Clearly, the taking of any action within the territory of the state
concerned, such as the introduction of troops, or even of officials,
indubitably constitutes intervention. Less clear is the situation in
which all actions taken are entirely outside of the state concerned,
such as caring for persons who have fled that state and who may
claim to be refugees, even though their own country accuses them
of being escaped criminals.
Some actions taken may, of course, have no physical manifestation at all; they may consist of recommendations addressed to the
state concerned or to other states, or consist of an offer of good
offices, which may be considered objectionable because of the legitimization of the other party implied thereby.
What if the steps taken have no direct manifestation outside of
the United Nations itself, that is, they involve no more than the
establishment of an organ to consider and to report on a conflict?
Indeed, the steps might be confined to the principal organ itself: a
decision to place a matter on the agenda, to hear petitioners or
delegations, or merely to receive written communications referring
to a conflict. As to some of these, it may be said that they constitute the minimal consideration the organization must give to an
issue brought to its attention in order to determine whether the
"domestic" exception applies at all. Obviously, these are questions
of threshold, but they are by no means trivial, as France recognized when it resisted, with steadily diminishing success, the placement on the agendas of successive regular sessions of the General
Assembly of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, and later, the
Algerian question, until it was faced with a drumbeat of ever more
critical and intrusive resolutions.
There is yet another question that must be asked about the definition of intervention. Can it be said that if the state concerned
specifically invites, or at least does not object to, the organization's
concern, the latter is not "intervening" at all? That is, does consent vitiate intervention, as in private law it may vitiate an otherwise actionable tort? Alternatively, it may be considered that a
government's consent legitimizes the intervention in spite of the
Charter prohibition, or that it at least estops the government from
complaining. This approach is, however, a potentially more dangerous one, for it may be argued that if a particular course of action
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does constitute an intervention, then the organization is precluded
from following it as a matter of its own constitutional law, regardless of a particular state's consent. Indeed, even if the government
primarily concerned consents to United Nations action with respect to a domestic conflict, other parties thereto might object to
such action and claim that it constitutes an illegal intervention.
In practice, what actions can and has the United Nations taken
in respect of internal conflicts, or in those conflicts that have not
been characterized as internationalized? For the most part, such
actions have been restricted to the grant of humanitarian assistance through organs such as UNICEF, the High Commissioner for
Refugees, the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, and the World Food
Program. Economic assistance has also been granted through some
of these organs as well as others such as the United Nations Development Program or the regular program for technical co-operation.
However, it should not be forgotten that the organization can also
provide military assistance in a primarily internal conflict, as it did
at the request of the Congo (now Zaire).
Article 2(7) has sometimes been characterized as a "cornerstone"
of the United Nations Charter in the sense that but for such a
limitation, many, if not most, states would not have joined the organization. Possibly a more accurate description is that the provision constitutes a boundary marker indicating the limit of legitimate United Nations concerns. As with any living institution, such
markers are not entirely immutable, but through their gradual
movements they reflect the health and vigor of the international
organization, and thus of the world community.

